Cheats Long in Market

One, find their own core business

Chinese old saying “Women are afraid to marry the wrong husband, afraid of the wrong man,” SMEs create a new brand, too, can choose an ideal innate competitiveness of their industries will naturally achieved a preliminary success.

To identify the core business enterprises must understand the industry environment: First, we must understand the industry competitors, that competition between existing companies; The second is to predict the potential threat of new entrants; Third, the evaluation from the client to meet new demands of consumers; Fourth, the evaluation of suppliers; Fifth, analysis and evaluation of emerging market similar products. Enterprises must clear insight into their position, play to his advantage.

We often say, “man without thought, there must be the near future”, for the development of the enterprise itself is true, there must be a core business goal that is at least 5-10 years, at least in the Chinese market 5 years . There is a premise that goal must be bold and mature strategic goals, rather than stay in profit,

Sell

The amount of such “digital level” low-level goals. When established as Disney, its objective is to bring joy to the world;

Sony

In the newly created product when the goal is to sell all over the world to change the West’s impression of the quality of their products; Nike recently created the goal is very clear, that is, “I want to beat Adidas” In fact, within a decade it really more than Adidas.

To create a brand for the Chinese long-term business, the objectives need to be completed quickly with the idea of consensus.

This we can see, to find their core business and not just simply set the direction and status of the industry, more importantly, companies have core consciousness (ie, core values and core mission), is more important is the leadership on the business objectives and actions to reach a consensus, including the six elements of business success, that strategic positioning, the focus of a clear response to the challenges of the feedback system, development speed and flexibility, corporate culture.

Accurately identify their own core business, you can define the following four aspects:

1, product or idea

Service

Develop the product or the development of services standards;

2, the definition of market scope, the product is to meet the material needs of consumers or the spiritual needs, for which a group;

3, division of industry boundaries, companies which operate in the field of the entry, define their core business.

4, define the brand’s core values, find the point of communication with consumers.

Second, how and big brand competition?

This is a modern Chinese products in many small and medium size manufacturers and service providers often think about. If the honest answer, that is: they should not compete with big brands. Since most big brands have long dominated the mass market, then why do they still go and compete with them? Instead, small businesses should focus on developing niche markets, looking for has not yet been fully developed market. Methods of attack or take wing, take a different regional market approach. Because the market differentiation will become a major market trends, build a strong corporate brand has become a major challenge, which will certainly provide more opportunities for SMEs to enter and maintain niche markets that big brands often can not or will not bother to pursue that market. Find a niche market is creating a strong competitive brands may have a way.

(1) market niche opportunities

When SMEs have been found in the main market leading brands

Monopoly

When the market should take into account the differentiation problem. Over time, the market will be subdivided into a number of consumer group or market segment, general products and services they want according to their specific preferences can be customized. Not for big business to take care of consumer groups, to meet their needs, market opportunities will emerge.

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Cheats Long in Market

The Reagan Legacy in Defense

Long before he was elected President, Ronald Reagan was asking military and other experts whether there was any alternative to the U.S. policy of mutual assured destruction (MAD), under which the United States and the Soviet Union each retained the nuclear capability to retaliate and destroy the other in the event of a nuclear attack.

Reagan apparently first encountered the idea of missile defense in 1967 when he visited Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, in the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. Teller briefed the new governor of California about the work being done to stop a missile attack on the United States. “It was a rather long presentation,” Teller recalled, “and I remember clearly that [Reagan] listened quite attentively.” Some day, Teller said, space-based lasers might be used to destroy nuclear missiles fired at the United States. Reagan responded that history showed that “all offensive weapons eventually met their match through defense countermeasures.”

In 1976, when he was challenging President Gerald Ford for the Republican presidential nomination, Reagan often expressed doubts about the MAD doctrine. Daniel O. Graham, the former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and a national security adviser to Reagan, recalled that Reagan put it this way: “Our nuclear policy is like a Mexican stand-off-two men with pistols pointed at each other’s head. If the man’s finger flinches, you each blow the other’s brains out. Can’t you military people come up with something better than that?”

Still looking for an answer, Reagan toured the headquarters of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in July 1979.

He asked General James Hill what could be done if the Soviets fired a missile at an American city. Nothing, Hill admitted. All NORAD could do was track the incoming missile and then give city officials 10-15 minutes’ warning before it hit.

The soon-to-be presidential candidate found it hard to accept that after three decades of the Cold War, the United States still had no defense against Soviet missiles. “We have spent all that money and have all that equipment,” he remarked, shaking his head, “and there is nothing we can do to prevent a nuclear missile from hitting us.”

Reagan kept seeking an alternative to MAD. It turned out to be the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), about which the normally modest Reagan said flatly, “SDI was my idea.” Helping President Reagan to develop the idea were key members of the White House staff. In 1981, domestic policy adviser Martin Anderson created an informal group, including science adviser George Keyworth and presidential counselor Edwin Meese, to discuss missile defense. In September and again in October, the group met with Edward Teller, Daniel Graham, and military expert Karl Bendetsen.

A turning point came in January 1982 when the group met with President Reagan. Also in attendance were Jaquelin Hume and Joseph Coors, both members of Reagan’s “kitchen cabinet” and trustees of The Heritage Foundation. Although the President did not then commit himself, he asked pointed questions about the feasibility and cost of missile defense. “It was clear from his demeanor,” recalled Anderson, “that he was convinced it could be done.” Coors later told Heritage Foundation President Ed Feulner that Reagan’s eyes “lit up” during the presentation.

More meetings followed inside and outside the White House, including a visit by Keyworth to Heritage. Keyworth’s support of SDI was critical. The science adviser had been skeptical about strategic defense since his days at Los Alamos in the late 1960s, but he was brought around by long talks with his mentor Edward Teller, his reading and research, and interactions with advocates like Graham and others at Heritage. Not everyone in the Administration shared the President’s enthusiasm about SDI. Once, with President Reagan present, Secretary of State George Shultz called Keyworth “a lunatic” for his advocacy of SDI, arguing that it would “destroy” NATO. But Reagan did not budge from his commitment, causing an admiring Keyworth to remark that Reagan “has this marvelous ability to work the whole thing while everybody else is working the parts.”

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced in a nationally televised address that development and deployment of a comprehensive antiballistic missile system would be his top defense priority-his “ultimate goal.” “I call upon the scientific community in our country,” Reagan said, “those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”

Ironically, SDI was immediately ridiculed as “Star Wars” by liberal detractors like Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who had been urging nuclear disarmament for decades. The New York Times scornfully called the initiative “a pipe dream, a projection of fantasy into policy.”

However, the Soviets took SDI very seriously. Led by Communist Party General Secretary Yuri Andropov, they protested that SDI was a “strike weapon” and a preparation for launching a U.S. nuclear attack because it would nullify any Soviet response. They warned that SDI would force an expensive arms race in space, at the end of which the strategic balance would remain the same despite the enormous expenditures.

Yet privately, the Soviets acknowledged they could not compete with the U.S. in such a race. Soviet scientists regarded SDI not as a pipe dream, but as a technological feat that they could not match.

General Vladimir Slipchenko, a leading military scientist who served on the Soviet general staff, recalled that SDI put the Soviet military “in a state of fear and shock.” General Makhmut Gareev, who headed the department of strategic analysis in the Soviet Ministry of Defense, later revealed what he told the Soviet general staff and the Politburo in 1983: “Not only could we not defeat SDI, SDI defeated all our possible countermeasures.” Mikhail Gorbachev’s desperate attempts at Reykjavik to take SDI off the table in his negotiations with Reagan underscored the critical importance of the initiative.

More than any other strategic action he took, Reagan’s unwavering commitment to SDI convinced the Kremlin that it could not win or afford an escalating arms race. SDI forced Gorbachev to sue for peace and to settle the Cold War at the bargaining table and not on the battlefield.

The Heritage Foundation is releasing a new documentary film, 33 Minutes – Missile Defense in February of 2009 which brings attention to the issue of missile defense for the United States. Find out more about this groundbreaking film at the site, 33 Minutes.

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The Reagan Legacy in Defense